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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the fiscal characteristics of the new members 
in the light of the requirements of the SGP and the criticisms levelled against the Pact and 
to see in what ways their initial conditions differ from those faced by the current euro 
zone countries in the run-up to the adoption of the euro. Overall, because of the lower 
debt levels and greater yield convergence already achieved, the new members will be 
able to rely less on gains from yield convergence than the current euro zone members 
were able to do. EU accession will also have a negative net impact on the budgets of the 
new members in the early years of membership. We also look at the cyclical sensitivities 
of the budgets and find that in the new members the smoothing capacity of the automatic 
stabilizers might be weaker than in the current euro zone members. Beyond these general 
characteristics, we also emphasize that there are large differences in the starting fiscal 
positions of the new members. Some of the policy implications of our findings are 
discussed. 
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 I. Introduction 
The ten new Members States (NMS)
1 of the European Union (EU) have to comply 
with the budgetary objectives stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty (MT) and the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), and are subject to the EU budgetary surveillance framework 
including, where relevant, the activation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). 
However, as long as they have not adopted the euro, the NMS will not be subject to the 
so-called enhanced budgetary surveillance under the EDP, nor to the sanctions foreseen 
for the members of the euro zone
2. The NMS have the obligation to adopt the euro and to 
meet the Maastricht criteria of public finance, inflation, interest rate and exchange rate. 
As soon as they meet these criteria, they are supposed to introduce the euro and to 
become a full participant of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the fiscal characteristics of the new members 
in the light of the requirements of the SGP and the criticisms levelled against the Pact and 
to see in what ways the initial conditions of the NMS differ from those faced by the 
current euro zone countries in the run-up to euro adoption. The paper is organized as 
follows. Section II briefly summarizes the main features and criticisms of the SGP, as 
well as the principal proposals for improvement of the Pact found in the literature. 
Section III examines the fiscal characteristics of the NMS from the perspective of 
meeting the Maastricht criteria on the road to euro adoption and from the broader 
perspective of the SGP framework. This section ends with a summary of our findings. 
Section IV discusses some of the policy implications of our findings. 
                                              
1 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia. 
2 For a description of the EDP, see Gros et al. (2004) and Cabral (2001). II. The Stability and Growth Pact 
1. Features 
The SGP and its rules are well known and well documented and we briefly recall 
only its main features and the rationale behind them
3. A unique feature of the euro zone is 
that monetary policy is centralized in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
while fiscal policy remains decentralized in the hands of the governments of the 
individual member states. It was therefore recognized that to support the ECB’s 
responsibility to maintain price stability and to prevent free-riding, fiscal policy had to be 
subject to rules in order to ensure discipline of public finances. These rules consist of two 
pillars. First, a Members State’s general government deficit/GDP ratio cannot exceed 3 
percent and its general government debt/GDP ratio cannot exceed 60 percent; in case the 
latter ratio is exceeded, the country has to demonstrate that its debt is being reduced and 
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. Second, Member States have to 
respect the medium-term budgetary objective of ‘close to balance or in surplus’ in order 
to allow for normal cyclical fluctuations, while keeping the deficit within the reference 
value of 3 percent of GDP. The 3 percent reference value for the deficit can be breached 
only under exceptional circumstances, when the excess results from an unusual event 
outside the control of the Member State and which has a major budgetary impact, or 
when it results from a severe economic downturn, defined as an annual fall of real GDP 
of at least 2 percent. A smaller, at least 0.75 percent decline in GDP, can be considered as 
exceptional taking into account the abruptness of the downturn and the accumulated loss 
of output relative to past trends. 
It is a legitimate question to ask how the reference values of 60 percent of GDP for 
the government debt and 3 percent of GDP for the fiscal deficit were chosen. It has been 
suggested (Thygesen, 2002) that 60 percent was the average debt ratio of the EU 
members around 1990 (the MT was signed in 1992) and if countries kept their deficit at 
                                              
3 A good description of the SGP and how it works can be found in Gros et al. (2004), Fatás et al. (2003), HM 
Treasury (2004), European Commission (2000, 2002, 2003) and ECB (1999). the 3 percent limit, their debt would converge to 60 percent, assuming that nominal GDP 
is rising at a trend rate of approximately 5 percent per year: 3 percent real growth 
(assumed to be the potential output growth in the EU) plus 2 percent inflation (in line 
with the ECB’s inflation target of 2 percent or less). While these reasonings have not 
been made officially public as far as we know, it is widely assumed that they lay behind 
the selection of the reference values. 
2. Criticisms of the SGP 
The main criticisms levelled against the SGP can be grouped under the following 
headings on the basis of what the Pact is seen as lacking: strong enough analytical 
foundations, symmetry, flexibility, incentives for good quality fiscal consolidation, and 
enforceability
4. We discuss these in turn below. 
a) Lack of clear analytical foundation 
A frequently mentioned criticism which seems to have dented the most the credibility 
of the SGP in the eyes of academics is that its main provisions lack a clear analytical 
foundation. The rationale behind the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ rule is debt 
sustainability, which means that the government cannot run a Ponzi scheme where debt 
grows forever, but it has to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint, that is to say, the 
present discounted value of its expenditures must equal the present discounted value of 
its revenues. However, as pointed out by Perotti et al. (1997), debt sustainability thus 
defined is of little practical use, since the intertemporal budget constraint has an infinite 
time horizon that does not sufficiently constrain government policies: anything can be 
assumed about the future. The intertemporal budget constraint depends on GDP growth, 
inflation and real interest rates, but the SGP does not take into account the differences in 
these areas across countries. Typically, catching-up economies such as the NMS have 
higher potential growth and higher inflation due to the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect, 
                                              
4 There is a good review of the criticisms of the SGP in Buti et al. (2003a). which is an equilibrium phenomenon
5. Thus, catching-up economies could, ceteris 
paribus, run higher deficits than more developed countries without jeopardizing the long-
term sustainability of public finances. 
Furthermore, the SGP does not address the critical issue of what is the optimal level 
of debt and treats low and high debt countries identically. Implicitly, the ‘close to balance 
or in surplus’ rule over the cycle means that eventually the debt will be run down to zero. 
Zero debt may not be an optimal solution since it ignores the benefits of the 
intergenerational distribution of taxes to finance, for example, infrastructural investments 
and reforms in the pension and health care systems that will benefit future generations
6. 
The optimal level of debt depends, inter alia, on whether the interest payments on the 
debt crowd out worthwhile investments and whether the disincentive effects of higher 
distortionary taxes to cover the interest payments are important or not (Aiyagari and 
McGrattan, 1998). From that perspective, low debt countries have more room for 
maneuver than high debt countries. The uniform deficit rule does not take into account 
the higher need for infrastructural investments in countries where the initial stock of 
public capital is insufficient, as in the catching-up NMS. Furthermore, the uniform 
reference value of the debt does not explicitly take into consideration the contingent 
liabilities due to population ageing and the state of pension reform that can vary from one 
country to another. 
A further criticism from an analytical standpoint is that the SGP disregards the 
aggregate fiscal stance of the euro area. In a monetary union, what matters from the point 
of view of macroeconomic stability is the fiscal stance of the union as a whole and not 
the fiscal stance of individual countries. The fiscal policies of large countries have a 
                                              
5 Kovács (2004) reports estimates in the literature of the BS effect that vary from less than one percent to up to 6.9 
percent per year, and von Hagen and Zhou (2004) report estimates varying between about 2 and 4 percent.  
6 Buiter and Grafe (2002) make the intriguing point that the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ rule could possibly 
mean that the EU governments will become net creditors. This would lead to the ironic result of the (partial) 
socialization of the means of production in the long-run, as governments will have to invest their cash surpluses in 
bonds and stocks of the private sector. Here we note that running a surplus in normal times was originally intended for 
countries with high debt ratios (above 60%) and therefore the government becoming a net creditor in the long-run is 
more a theoretical possibility than a real threat. greater impact on the fiscal stance of the union than the fiscal policies of smaller 
countries. 
b) Lack of symmetry 
Two issues are relevant under this heading. First, for countries which have not yet 
reached the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ position, the requirement that they reduce 
continuously the deficit may entail procyclical policies in an economic downturn. This 
problem has been mitigated by the European Council decision of March 2003, specifying 
that the above requirement will be judged on the basis of the cyclically adjusted budget 
position. However, countries which have not yet reached the 3 percent deficit level and 
are therefore outside of the euro zone have to satisfy the Maastricht reference value in 
nominal and not cyclically adjusted terms in order to be able to adopt the euro. In the run-
up to the euro zone, these countries may therefore confront a situation in which they have 
to follow a procyclical policy. Second, while the SGP sets a limit on the maximum deficit 
and foresees penalties for breaking it, the Pact does not specify surpluses and does not 
otherwise provide enough incentives for reducing the deficit and/or accumulating 
surpluses during boom periods. The failure of sufficiently reducing the deficits in the 
upswing of 1998-2000 is seen as the major reason for the breaking of the deficit criterion 
by several Member States in 2002 and 2003
7. 
c) Lack of flexibility 
The loss of independent monetary policy within the euro area calls for the 
preservation of fiscal flexibility to cope with asymmetric shocks or the asymmetric 
effects of common shocks. This means that countries should have enough room to let the 
autonomic stabilizers operate fully or, if necessary, to use discretionary policy to respond 
to shocks. The question then is whether the 3 percent deficit reference value provides the 
needed flexibility. The answer to this question depends on the starting level of the deficit 
and the output smoothing capacity of the automatic stabilizers. Some studies have found 
                                              
7 See Fatás et al. (2003). (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998 and Kiander and Virén, 2000) that the deficit limit 
might not provide enough flexibility for some of the EU-15 countries. 
d) Quality of fiscal consolidation 
The quality of fiscal consolidation matters because taxes and expenditures affect 
output differently due to their different impact on income distribution and incentives. 
Empirical research has demonstrated that consolidation relying on current expenditure 
cuts rather than tax increases are likely to last longer and are thus more successful 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995 and 1997; Perotti et al. 1997; Buti and Sapir, 1998; von Hagen 
et al. 2001). The SGP, by defining the fiscal target in terms of deficit numbers, neglects 
the quality of fiscal adjustment. Von Hagen et al. (2001) provide empirical evidence that 
high debt to GDP ratio and weak domestic and international economy induce 
governments to undertake expenditure-based rather than revenue-based consolidation 
strategies. This proves that governments will undertake quality adjustment under 
economic constraints, but the SGP does not explicitly provide incentives for undertaking 
quality consolidation. 
e) Enforceability 
The major criticism in this area is that the fines and penalties foreseen within the SGP 
framework are difficult to enforce, because the decision to subject a country to the 
penalties lies in the hands of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) 
which is composed of politicians who are more understanding of and therefore more 
indulgent toward the problems faced by their peers. The decision of November 25, 2003 
to hold the EDP for France and Germany in “abeyance for the time being” is an 
unmistakable sign of such indulgence. The frequent recourse to one-off measures and 
creative accounting has also undermined the seriousness of the enforcement procedures. 
Most importantly, the long time lags involved in the enforcement procedure mean that the 
penalties, even if enforced, will come too late to trigger timely responses. Prior to the 
third stage of EMU, there was an incentive to adjust in order to join the currency union, but having adopted the euro that carrot disappeared and the stick remains of dubious 
efficiency. 
3. Proposals for improvement found in the literature 
There have been many proposals for improvement of the SGP and even its usefulness 
has been questioned (De Grauwe, 2002)
8. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus among 
academics and opinion makers that as long as fiscal policy remains decentralized, there is 
a need for fiscal rules in the euro area. Buti et al. (2003a) review the EU fiscal rules 
against the criteria of Kopits-Symansky and Inman
9 and conclude that overall these rules 
perform quite well with respect to these compliance criteria, except with regard to 
enforcement. Generally, the proposals for improvement try to address one or several of 
the criticisms discussed above, although none of the proposals represent a Pareto 
improvement, in that none of them solve all problems outlined above and may even 
aggravate some of them (Buti et al., 2003a). Buiter and Grafe (2002) propose the 
‘permanent balance rule’ that takes into account different initial positions (debt level, 
stock of public sector capital, stage of pension reform) and different future development 
paths (GDP growth, inflation). The rule requires that the inflation-and-real-growth-
adjusted permanent government budget is in balance or in surplus. This rule is attractive 
theoretically, but it requires estimating future growth and inflation which could become a 
contentious issue and hence would be difficult to enforce. Another analytically attractive 
proposed rule is the one that would consider the fiscal stance of the euro area as a whole 
and would allocate “deficit shares” to individual countries. These shares could be 
assigned by a decision of ECOFIN (the French proposal)
10, or by the markets through a 
system of tradable budget deficit permits (Casella, 2001). The main arguments against 
such a scheme is that the risks of triggering a financial crisis are not uniform across 
governments (Buti et al. 2003a) and that the allocation of deficit shares, whether by 
                                              
8 There is a review of the various proposals in Buti et al. (2003a) and also in HM Treasury (2004). 
9 Kopits and Symansky (1998) and Inman (1996). See also Kopits (2001). 
10 Proposal put forward by the Minister for Finance of France at the informal Ecofin Council in Dresden in April 
1999 (Buti et al., 2003a). bureaucratic/political decision or by the markets, requires a degree of political 
coordination and cooperation that seems to be lacking for the time being. 
Other proposals aim at applying the “golden rule”, whereby investment expenditure is 
excluded from the deficit calculation. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) propose to exclude 
net investment (gross investment less depreciation) from the deficit on the grounds that 
depreciation of public capital is equivalent to current expenditure. The rationale for the 
golden rule is that borrowing should be allowed to finance investments since their return 
will occur in the future and hence their cost should be distributed over time. Excluding 
investment from the deficit would remove the financial constraint on public investment 
under the SGP and could also help avoid procyclical tightening of fiscal policy in a 
downturn. Although intuitively appealing, the arguments advanced against the golden 
rule
11 are that it is difficult to determine what constitutes investment, it could lead to a 
bias in favor of physical assets, it would provide new incentives for creative accounting, 
and that it could undermine the efforts to consolidate the public finances. 
A final set of proposals which we would like to mention deals with institutional 
reforms. Wyplosz (2002) proposes to establish in each country Fiscal Policy Committees 
entrusted with the responsibility to set annual deficit targets consistent with long-run debt 
sustainability. Fatás et al. (2003) argue for the creation of a Sustainability Council at the 
level of the euro area, with the task of monitoring the sustainability of Member States’ 
public finances
12. The idea behind these proposals is to find in the fiscal area a 
counterpart to national central banks or the ECB that could bring governments to better 
adhere to fiscal discipline. The idea is appealing but a lot depends on the political will of 
elected governments to respect more strictly the recommendations of the proposed 
national Fiscal Policy Committees or the euro area Council than they currently respect 
the recommendations of the Commission. 
                                              
11 See, for instance, European Commission (2003) and Buti et al. (2003a). 
12 Others, for instance Gros et al. (2004), have also made similar proposals. III. Fiscal Characteristics of the New Member States 
The fiscal characteristics of the NMS have to be assessed from two perspectives: (1) 
from the narrower perspective of meeting the numerical deficit and debt Maastricht 
criteria on the road to euro adoption; and (2) from the broader perspective of the SGP 
framework in the light of the criticisms of the Pact and the proposed improvements 
discussed above. Although the issues are linked, it is useful from a policy point of view to 
approach the assessment separately from the above two perspectives. Such an assessment 
has to consider the initial conditions faced by the NMS, as well as the challenges lying 
ahead. We undertake this exercise by comparing the situation of the NMS with the 
experiences of the current euro zone members. 
1. The road to the euro 
On their way toward adopting the euro, the NMS face the task of reducing their fiscal 
deficits to the Maastricht criteria of 3 percent of GDP. Several NMS have announced that 
they want to adopt the euro by 2008 or earlier, while others plan to join later. On the 
whole, a distance of five years from euro adoption appears to be a good benchmark to 
which to compare the starting positions of the current euro zone members with the 
starting positions of the NMS. Figures shows the deviation from the 3 percent deficit in 
2003 for the NMS and five years prior to the adoption of the euro for the current 
members (1996 for Greece and 1994 for the others). With the exception of Malta, the 
deviations for the NMS are about the same or less than were the deviations for the 
majority of the current euro zone members. The starting deficit conditions of the NMS 
are thus not worse than the conditions faced by the current members five years prior to 
adopting the euro. In fact, for the three Baltic states and Slovenia the conditions are 
significantly more favorable.  
As regards government debt, it is generally lower in the NMS than it is in the euro 
zone countries currently or five years prior to euro adoption (Figure 2.). The exceptions 
are Cyprus, Malta and Hungary. There are several reasons behind the low debt levels in the NMS from Central and Eastern Europe. First, the Baltic States did not inherit any of 
the liabilities of the former Soviet Union while Poland obtained partial debt forgiveness. 
Second, some countries (e.g. Hungary) used privatization receipts to reduce the 
government debt. Third, a part of the social safety net expenditures were borne by state 
enterprises, most notably in the form of within-the-gate unemployment. When these 
enterprises were privatized, the new owner often took over their debts, which was then 
reflected in a lower purchase price. There were also developments in the opposite 
direction, most notably when the government assumed the debts of state-owned banks 
and enterprises in order to consolidate them prior to privatization
13. 
The lower level of debt has implications for the way in which the fiscal consolidation 
needed to reach the 3 percent Maastricht deficit criteria can be achieved. Together with 
the greater convergence of bond yields already obtained by the NMS (Figure 3.), the new 
member countries will be able to rely less on the gains from interest rate convergence to 
reduce the deficit than were the current euro zone countries (Figure 4.). During the last 
five years prior to euro adoption, such gains represented between 2.4 to 5 percent of GDP 
in half of the current euro zone members. Among the NMS, using the spot euro bond 
yield as reference, only Hungary, Malta and Poland will have gains of between 1.3 and 2 
percent of GDP, while all the others will have smaller gains. If we use the 2009 forward 
euro bond yield as reference, the gains will be even smaller
14. The greater convergence of 
bond yields in the NMS is a result of the progress with disinflation and the markets’ 
expectations that these countries will adopt the euro in the not too distant future, which 
have contributed to a reduction of the risk premia. Another factor reducing the potential 
gains from yield convergence is that in some of the NMS a large portion of the 
government debt is in foreign currency where the scope for interest rate convergence is 
limited. 
                                              
13 P. Kiss and Szapáry (2000) review the impact of debt assumptions on Hungary’s public finances. 
14 In estimating the gains for the NMS, we assumed that the debt/GDP ratios remain constant. The interest rates 
used were 5-year eurobond spot and 2009 forward yields. The five year period overestimates somewhat the average 
maturity of domestic debt of the NMS. Figure 5. shows the required changes in the primary balance to reach the 3 percent 
Maastricht deficit limit. A negative value shows the required improvement and a positive 
value the “permissible” deterioration. For the high-debt NMS (Cyprus, Hungary, Malta) 
and the Czech Republic, the required improvements are significantly higher than were 
necessary for most of the euro zone members, owing to the smaller gains from yield 
convergence in the former. Only high-debt Italy and France, where the yield convergence 
five years prior to euro adoption was already nearly complete, needed primary balance 
improvements similar to those of the above mentioned new members. In these latter 
countries, therefore, most of the adjustment to reach the 3 percent limit will have to be 
made in the primary balance. 
This brings us to examine the size and composition of government spending in the 
NMS. The adequate size of government spending is difficult to determine since it 
depends on a country’s social preferences. One benchmark that can be used to judge the 
relative size of government is per capita income: when incomes rise, the demand for 
certain publicly provided services, such as education, R&D, infrastructure services tend 
to increase so that low income countries might need extra room to accommodate these 
higher expenditures as per capita incomes rise. Figure 6. plots the level of government 
expenditure as a ratio of GDP against per capita income on a purchasing power parity 
basis. What the Figure illustrates is that in the Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) the spending levels are about the same as in those EU 
members where the levels of expenditure are the highest, even though the per capita 
income is much smaller in the Visegrád countries. Thus, using per capita income as a 
benchmark, the governments in these new member countries appear to be oversized. Von 
Hagen (2004) comes to the same conclusion using regression analysis where, in addition 
to per capita income, he also takes into consideration the openness of the economy on the 
grounds that more open economies are more exposed to external shocks and therefore 
need larger government sector as a buffer. It is necessary to point out though that both per 
capita income and openness are imperfect benchmarks to judge the adequacy of the size of the public sector, because they ignore the important question of which sector, public or 
private, can provide most efficiently the services. 
The above findings about the level of expenditure in the NMS have to be looked at in 
conjunction with the special needs for additional spending in these countries. It is 
common wisdom that transition economies need to strengthen their infrastructure. Since 
the early 1990s, average government investment has been consistently higher in the 
Central and Eastern European transition countries than in the EU (Figure 7.). This is 
normal, since the social marginal productivity of infrastructural investment will tend to 
be higher in less developed countries. For the period ahead, the transition countries will 
need to maintain a relatively high level of public investment expenditure given their 
relatively low stock of public capital. 
Furthermore, EU accession will involve additional government expenditure and some 
revenue loss for the new members, which will be offset only partly by transfers from the 
EU. The net effect will be negative in the initial years of membership due to the 
combination of the following main factors: (1) the new members have to pay 
immediately after accession their contribution to the EU common budget; (2) a part of the 
EU transfers to finance projects are channeled directly to private sector recipients with no 
positive direct effect on the budget; (3) those transfers that are channeled to the budget 
for project implementation have to be pre-financed by the government; (4) the EU 
transfers cannot be used to finance projects which, in the absence of the transfers, would 
have been financed from the budget (the principle of additionality); (5) there is a 
domestic co-financing requirement of EU-financed projects; (6) there will be increased 
administrative burden associated with the implementation of EU financed projects; and 
(7) the removal of custom duties on imports from EU members and the sharing of 
customs receipts on imports from third countries involve a loss of revenue. These 
negative effects will be partly compensated by the phasing out of domestic agricultural 
subsidies which will be replaced by EU subsidies.  
Several authors have estimated the net direct budgetary effects of accession (see 
Table 1.). All the authors have come up with a net negative direct effect on the budget during the first years of membership. The estimates range between 1 and 4.75 percent of 
GDP per year. The rather wide range of these estimates reflects the differences in the 
underlying assumptions regarding absorption capacity and the space and cost of financing 
the acquis communautaires, such as environmental protection and infrastructure. These 
estimates concern only the direct budgetary effects, which may be mitigated by favorable 
indirect effects that are difficult to quantify, such as those resulting from accession-driven 
private sector activity. However, these favorable effects will come on stream only 
gradually and the assessment that accession will lead initially to a higher burden on the 
budget is not questioned. 
2. The SGP framework 
Two issues are relevant from the perspective of the SGP framework: the cyclical 
sensitivity of the budgets and debt sustainability. 
a) Cyclical sensitivity 
In the SGP framework, the automatic stabilizers are to be allowed to operate fully 
without breaching the 3 percent deficit limit. The European Commission has calculated 
cyclical safety margins for each of the EU-15 countries
15, showing the size of the 
deterioration in the budget balance in case output falls below potential. Subtracting these 
safety margins from the reference value of 3 percent, we obtain the so-called “minimal 
benchmark” which a country should at least achieve over the cycle in order to avoid 
breaching the 3 percent limit in a downturn. 
Using the methodology of the European Commission (2000), we calculated the safety 
margins for the eight new members from Central and Eastern Europe (CEEs) (Table 2:)
16. 
                                              
15 European Commission (2000, 2002). 
16 As discussed in the Annex, this methodology, which estimates the output gap by an HP-filtered trend approach, 
has several weaknesses and has been improved by the Commission by using a production function approach (European 
Commission, 2002). We used the former methodology because of the lack of readily available production function 
calculations for the CEEs. For Hungary, P. Kiss and Vadas (2004) estimate cyclical sensitivities and output gaps using 
three different methods: that of the European Commission (2002), the ECB (Bouthevillain et al., 2001) and a 
methodology developed by the authors to take into account the specific fiscal and economic characteristics of Hungary. 
For the sake of comparability, we did not use the P. Kiss and Vadas (2004) estimates for Hungary. Despite somewhat higher output volatilities
17, the cyclical safety margins are generally 
lower in the CEEs than in the EU-15, as a result of lower sensitivity of the budgets of the 
CEEs to the economic cycle. The lower sensitivity is explained essentially by the smaller 
reliance on cycle-sensitive direct taxes and the significantly lower shares in total 
spending of cycle-sensitive expenditures on unemployment benefits
18. One reason for the 
smaller reliance on direct taxes and the correspondingly higher reliance on indirect taxes 
is that tax evasion has been a widespread problem in the CEEs and the collection of 
indirect taxes has proved to be more efficient. Other reasons are tax holidays and the low 
level of corporate taxes, which have been used as an incentive to attract foreign 
investment. The smaller share of expenditures on unemployment compensation is due to 
the generally less generous benefits. 
The lower cyclical safety margins mean that the “minimal benchmark”, i.e. the 
maximum deficit to be respected over the cycle without running the risk of breaching the 
3 percent limit, is higher in the CEEs
19 than in the EU-15
20. This finding has to be looked 
at in conjunction with the smoothing capacity of the automatic stabilizers. Many authors 
have researched and calculated the output stabilization effects of automatic stabilizers in 
the euro area
21. Calculating these effects for the CEEs is beyond the scope of this paper 
and should be the subject of future research. One factor which tends to weaken the 
smoothing capacity of automatic stabilizers in the CEEs is that they are small open 
economies (except Poland) where the smoothing capacity is reduced by the leakages 
through imports. The lower cyclical budget sensitivity together with the openness of the 
                                              
17 See Darvas and Szapáry (2004) for a discussion of output volatilities in the euro area and the CEEs. 
18 Direct taxes as a ratio of GDP averaged 14 percent in the EU-15 and 10 percent in the CEEs in the period 1992-
2002. Unemployment benefit payments to GDP averaged 1.73 percent in the EU-15 and 0.68 in the CEEs (Sources: 
AMECO and Riboud et al. 2002). 
19 Our estimates of the cyclical safety margins of the budgets of the CEEs are fairly close to those calculated by 
IMF (2004), but are substantially lower than those calculated by Coricelli and Ercolani (2002). These authors estimate 
the safety margins for Hungary and Poland to be over 3 percent, mainly because they find output to be more volatile. 
This may be due to the inclusion of the years 1990-94 which were characterized by high transition-induced output 
volatility. For this reason, we excluded those years from our calculations. 
20 For the EU-15, the output gaps are those calculated by European Commission (2002) using the more 
sophisticated production function methodology, while for the CEE-8 we used the HP-filtered trend approach. The HP-
filter approach yields even smaller minimal benchmarks for the EU-15. 
21 Buti et al. (2003b); Buti and van den Noord (2003 and 2004); Brunila et al. (2002); European Commission (2002); 
Barrell and Pina (2000); Kiander and Virén (2000); van den Noord (2000) CEEs imply that these countries may have to rely more on discretionary measures to 
smooth the economic cycle. There are, however, risks involved in using discretionary 
changes and one has to ensure that the discretionary measures are reversible and do not 
lead to a deterioration of the underlying budget position (see European Commission, 
2002). 
b) Debt sustainability 
As seen earlier, the debt levels in the NMS are generally lower than in the euro area. 
As catching-up economies, they also have a higher potential growth rate, as well as 
higher BS-induced inflation and hence lower real interest rates once they have adopted 
the euro and face similar nominal interest rates. The combination of these factors would, 
ceteris paribus, imply that the NMS could run higher deficits and still maintain the long-
run sustainability of public finances. However, when assessing debt sustainability, one 
also has to take into account future liabilities. The most important of these are future 
pension payment obligations and health care outlays for the elderly due to population 
ageing. 
As can be seen in Table 3., the old-age dependency ratios in the CEEs are somewhat 
below those of the EU-15, but the fertility rates are also smaller which, combined with an 
increase in life expectancy that will accompany the growth in per capita income in the 
CEEs, will sharply raise the dependency ratios. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland these ratios are projected to double or more than double by 2050. The burden that 
these population trends implies for the government budgets can be reduced by reforming 
the pension systems, such as introducing a second pillar funded scheme (but the transition 
cost of exiting from the pay-as-you-go system remains), raising the level of retirement 
age, tightening eligibility for early retirement or reducing the replacement rate. About 
half of the CEEs have already introduced a multi-pillar system and others plan to do so 
(European Commission, 2003). A second element of future liabilities that can burden the 
budgets of the CEEs in the years ahead is the overall stock of guarantees granted mostly 
for enterprise borrowings in the sectors of public transportation and energy. Although the stock of guarantees has been substantially reduced as a result of privatization, it remains 
important in some countries. 
It is difficult to judge the optimal target for public debt. It depends, as said, on the 
crowding out effect of interest payments and the negative output effect of distortionary 
taxes to finance these payments. Furthermore, it also depends on the future rate of return 
of the expenditures that are financed by borrowing, such as investments and reforms that 
benefit future generations, or reforms that reduce future liabilities (e.g. pension reforms). 
IMF (2004) suggests a prudent public debt ratio of around 45 percent of GDP for the 
CEEs. The UK Government’s fiscal policy objective is to maintain net debt below 40 
percent of GDP over the economic cycle. Using these numbers as a benchmark for 
illustrative purposes – but without suggesting that this is an appropriate debt level for all 
countries under all circumstances – we show in Table 4. the improvement in the primary 
balances needed to reach a 40 percent debt/GDP ratio within ten years in the CEEs. A 
positive value in Table 4 shows in percent of GDP the size of the improvement in the 
primary balance needed now and to be kept constant in order to reduce the debt/GDP 
ratio to 40 percent in ten years in case the current level of debt exceeds 40 percent, or the 
improvement needed in order not to exceed the limit in case the current level of debt is 
less than 40 percent. A negative value indicates the “permissible” deterioration in the 
primary balance without exceeding the debt limit. As can be seen from Table 4, Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Malta need significant improvements in the primary 
balances in order to avoid that their debt levels exceed 40 percent of GDP by 2013. This 
is because both the debt levels and the primary deficits are high in these countries. Poland 
and Slovakia need only a small improvement, while the Baltic countries and Slovenia 
could in principle let their primary balances deteriorate, since they have low debts and 
low primary deficits or have surpluses. 
3. Summary of findings 
Our main findings regarding the fiscal characteristics of the NMS from the 
perspective of the Maastricht criteria and the SGP can be summarized as follows. There are large differences among the NMS as to their starting fiscal positions. The 
budget deficits of the Baltic states and Slovenia were already smaller than 3 percent of 
GDP in 2003 and these countries have also the lowest debt/GDP ratios among the NMS, 
well below 60 percent of GDP. Estonia scores the highest, with practically no 
government debt and an overall budget surplus. Those countries which have recorded the 
largest deficits in 2003, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Malta, have also the 
highest debt levels. Clearly, the NMS cannot be regarded as a group but have to be 
looked at on a case-by-case basis. 
The new members, particularly those with less favorable starting fiscal positions, face 
great challenges on the road to euro adoption because the potential budgetary gains from 
yield convergence are limited and EU accession will have a net negative impact on their 
budgets in the initial years of accession. At the same time, pension and other needed 
reforms, as well as the necessity to keep up with the higher level of infrastructure 
investment, imply additional budgetary burdens.  
The level of debt is generally lower in the NMS than in the euro area. They also have 
higher potential growth and will face lower real interest rates within the euro zone due to 
the higher BS-induced inflation, which improve their prospects of debt sustainability. 
However, they also face considerable budgetary pressures in the medium to long-run 
because of the high stock of government guarantees in some countries and ageing related 
future pension and health care payment obligations.  
IV. Policy Implications 
The main ideas that we would like to communicate in this paper which have a policy 
implication are the following:  
1. From a debt sustainability perspective, the lower debt and the prospect of faster growth 
implies that those NMS where the deficit is significantly below 3 percent could be given 
a longer period of time to reach the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ position. This would 
be also justified because the NMS need more infrastructural development and EU accession will put additional burden on the budgets in the initial years of membership. 
We should remember that in the run-up to euro adoption, the current cohesion countries 
were the recipients of much larger EU transfers than what the NMS are expected to 
receive in the coming years. More research should be undertaken to define debt 
sustainability taking also into account future liabilities, so that more concrete guidelines 
could be issued for the required speed of adjustment.  
It has been sometimes suggested that the SGP or its interpretation need to be 
modified to take into account the special circumstances of the new Member States. The 
large differences in the initial conditions of the NMS do not support that argument. 
Indeed, several current euro zone members have lower debt than some of the NMS and 
the less developed current euro zone members have also higher potential growth rates 
than the other members. The improvement of the SGP is needed not because of 
enlargement, but because it makes good economic sense to take into account the 
differences in initial conditions for all countries. Enlargement only highlights the need for 
improvement by widening the differences among countries subject to the provisions of 
the SGP. 
A misconception has to be corrected in this regard. In many documents and 
declarations reference is made to the “equal treatment” of members when talking about 
the uniform application of the provisions of the SGP. Equal treatment in an economic 
sense would mean that one differentiates according to initial conditions and future 
liabilities. Uniformity in this case is not equal treatment. One can, therefore, support 
those suggested improvements in the SGP that would take into account more explicitly 
differences in debt levels, economic growth, demographic trends and reforms that reduce 
future liabilities. 
2. There are good reasons for keeping the 3 percent limit even from the perspective of the 
NMS, because those new members which exceed that limit are also those which have the 
highest debt levels. They have, therefore, an interest in reducing the deficit to below 3 
percent earlier rather than later so that they can benefit from a reduction in debt service payments which would free resources for other purposes − and that irrespective of when 
they plan to adopt the euro. 
There is another reason why the high-deficit NMS have to reduce the fiscal deficit. 
As long as they are not within the euro area, they are exposed to speculative capital 
movements triggered by market perception about the sustainability of the external 
payments position
22. While the rate of investment in the NMS will remain high, they also 
face the prospect of an erosion of net household savings as a result of credit booms. 
Household credit is typically very low in the CEEs and one can expect a rapid growth in 
such credit as a result of the declining interest rates, the prospect of higher permanent 
income levels, and the greater willingness of banks to lend to households as they move 
into retail banking, an area which the banks have eschewed so far because of the higher 
perceived risks. Hungary has already experienced a sharp reduction in net household 
savings in recent years. Under these circumstances, the burden falls on the budget to 
maintain an external position which is seen as viable by the markets. If the cyclical 
upturn that has just started proves to be durable, this would be an ideal time to accelerate 
the consolidation in the high-deficit NMS, thus reducing the risk of having to pursue 
procyclical policy in a downturn. Since the government sector in most high-debt NMS is 
already oversized relative to their per capita income, consolidation should be done 
through cutting current primary spending, while leaving room for those expenditures that 
are necessary for the building up of the stock of public capital and for the implementation 
of reforms that will bring long-term benefits.  
3. More emphasis should be placed on improvements in budgetary procedures. Budgetary 
practices vary a great deal from one country to another: the forecasting, planning, 
implementing, accounting and monitoring procedures are not the same. Deficiencies in 
these areas can lead to forecasting errors and ex-post revisions of data that make 
enforcement difficult and eventually undermine credibility. Guidelines for best practices 
                                              
22 Barnhill and Kopits (2003) discuss the fiscal vulnerabilities faced by emerging markets. in budgetary procedures could be issued by the Council and included in the monitoring 
under the SGP. 
4. Finally, we have to remind ourselves that the Maastricht-related constraints have led to 
a significant reduction in the deficits and debt levels of the current euro zone members 
and there is no evidence that it has impaired the stabilization role of fiscal policy or that it 
had negatively affected public investment (Gali and Perotti, 2003). While rules are 
necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the single monetary policy, the need for 
rules goes beyond that: fiscal rules are justified in their own rights as an instrument to 
foster budgetary discipline. Markets will eventually penalize the sinners but markets react 
generally too late, by which time the cost of adjustment is already high. Enlargement 
strengthens the need for rules, since one can observe in several NMS mounting popular 
pressure for relaxing fiscal policy as expectations have been heightened with EU 
accession and the appetite for reforms has weakened. The rules have to be respected by 
all, however. It will be difficult to muster the critically important political support in the 
new Member States for the commitment to meet the 3 percent deficit requirement to join 
the monetary union while current members continue to breach that limit.  References 
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3238., February 2002. ANNEX: The Calculation of Cyclical Safety Margins 
The cyclical safety margins show the size of the deterioration in the budget balance in 
case output falls short of potential output. Subtracting these safety margins from the 3 
percent reference value of the Maastricht Treaty, we obtain the so-called “minimal 
benchmark”, which is the cyclically adjusted deficit consistent with the 3 percent limit. 
The calculation of cyclical safety margins consists of two steps: the calculation of the 
largest output gap that a country is likely to encounter and the sensitivity of its budget to 
the economic cycle. The budget sensitivity indicator is an elasticity of the budget deficit 
to the output gap, calculated as a weighted average of elasticities of the following budget 
items: direct taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions on the revenue side, 
and unemployment benefits on the expenditure side. 
The largest value of output gap  
We followed the methodology used in European Commission (2000). The output gap 
is obtained as the logarithmic difference of actual and trend output:  
ti ti ti y y OG ˆ − =               (1) 
where OGti stands for the output gap for the i-th country in period t, yti is the log of actual output 
for country i in period t, and ŷti is the trend of log output y for the i-th country in period t. 
The largest output gap that country i is likely to face (GAPi) is calculated as a 
combination of three sub-indicators: a) the absolute value of the largest negative output 
gap recorded in country i over the whole sample period (1995-2002 in our case); b) the 
unweighted average of the three largest negative output gaps in all countries studied (the 
10 new Member States in our case) over the whole sample period; and c) the average 
volatility of the output gap in each new Member State, measured as twice its standard 
deviation. The largest value for the output gap is calculated as the mid-point of the worst 
two of these three sub-indicators. We excluded from our calculations the years before 
1995, a period of a transformation recession when GDP fell sharply in the CEEs.  
The budget sensitivity indicator The sensitivity of the budget (SENS) to the output gap is a weighted average of the 
elasticities of budget items for each country: 
ub sc it dt SENS UB SC IT DT ε ε ε ε − + + = ,           (2) 
where εDT, εIT, εSC, are the output elasticities of revenue from direct taxes, indirect taxes and 
social security contributions; εUB is the output elasticity of unemployment benefits, and dt, it, sc 
are the ratios of revenue received from direct taxes, indirect taxes and social contributions to 
GDP. ub is the ratio of unemployment benefits to GDP. 
Cyclical safety margins and minimal benchmarks 
Cyclical safety margins (CSM) are calculated as a product of the largest output gap 
and the budget sensitivity indicator: 
i i i SENS GAP CSM × =        (3) 
The value of CSM shows the extent to which the budget balance in a given country is 
likely to deteriorate in times of severe economic downturn. 
Finally, the minimal benchmark (MB) is the gap between the cyclical safety margin and the 
Maastricht reference value of 3 percent:  
i i CSM MB − = % 3         ( 4 )  
The minimal benchmark shows the cyclically adjusted deficit consistent with the 3 
percent reference value. 
Sources and description of data 
The Commission uses annual GDP figures since 1960 for the calculation of trend 
GDP and output gaps. In the Central and Eastern European countries, the sample period 
is very short due to structural changes and severe transformation recessions in the early 
nineties, so we took seasonally adjusted quarterly data since 1995 (on constant 1995 
prices). For the sources of quarterly data refer to Darvas and Szapáry (2004). Following the methodology of the Commission, we obtained trend output using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with the standard parameter of 1600 for quarterly data
23. 
For the relative weight of each revenue item we used the AMECO database. As for the 
expenditure side, in the absence of readily available data across countries for a sufficiently long 
period of time, we used the data for unemployment benefits from Riboud et al. (2002); for the 
output elasticity of unemployment benefits, we used the estimate for the Czech Republic 
calculated by the Czech Ministry of Finance which can be regarded as an approximation of the 
elasticities in the CEEs. 
Assumptions and limitations of the methodology 
There are some implicit assumptions in the Commission’s methodology of 
calculating cyclical safety margins which limit its applicability and require caution when 
interpreting the results, as pointed out also by the Commission itself. Namely, constant 
values are assumed for (1) the share of the relevant budget items in the total budget (in 
our case these were 10-year averages); (2) the cyclical elasticities of the relevant budget 
items; and (3) the structure of GDP so that a 1 percentage point change in output gap is 
assumed to affect all tax bases in the same way
24. We did not attempt to estimate the 
income elasticities of the revenue items due to the shortage of readily available data. 
Instead, we assumed that they are equal to one. This is very close to the average value 
estimated for the OECD countries (see van den Noord, 2000). 
                                              
23 European Commission (2000) calculated the output gap as a deviation of output from trend obtained using the 
HP-filter. However, in its latest calculation (European Commission, 2002), the Commission estimated potential output 
using the production functions approach. 
24 This assumption was relaxed in the more sophisticated approach of Bouthevillain et al. (2001). Figures 
Figure 1. Deviations from the Maastricht Deficit Criterion of 3 Percent of GDP Prior to euro 
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* For the euro zone members, five years prior to euro adoption: 1996 for Greece and 1994 for the other members. 
For the new Member States, the data refer to 2003. General government net borrowing as a ratio of GDP on the basis 
of ESA95. The figure for the Czech Republic does not include debt assumptions. 
 Figure 2. Debt Ratios Prior to euro adoption and in 2003
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* For the euro zone members, in 2003 and five years prior to euro adoption: 1996 for Greece and 1994 for the 
other members. For the new Member States, the data refer to 2003. General government consolidated budget debt as a 
ratio of GDP. 
 Figure 3. Bond Yield Convergence in the Run-Up to euro adoption and Scope for 
Convergence in the New Member States
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* For euro zone countries, convergence criterion bond yields: the difference in yields between March 1995 and 
March 2000 for Greece and between March 1993 and March 1998 for the other euro zone countries. For new Member 
States, the difference between domestic convergence criterion bond yields and the convergence criterion euro bond yield 
in January 2004. 
 Figure 4. Gains in Interest Payments due to Bond Yield Convergence in the Run-Up to euro 
adoption
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* For the euro zone countries, interest rate convergence gains during 1995-2000 for Greece and during 1993-1998 
for the other euro zone members. The calculations were made on the basis of the end of period debt/GDP ratios. The 
gains thus calculated do not necessarily correspond to the actual improvements in the interest payment balances because 
of changes in the debt/GDP ratios during the period considered. For the new Member States, the calculations were 
based on 5-year euro bond spot and 2009 forward yields; constant debt/GDP ratios were assumed up to 2009. 
 Figure 5. Required Improvements in the Primary Balances to Reach the Maastricht Deficit 
Criterion of 3 Percent Taking Account of Gains from Bond Yield Convergence
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* See footnote for Figure 4. A negative value shows the required improvement and a positive value the 
„permissible” deterioration in the primary balance in order to meet the 3 percent deficit limit. Figure 6.Per Capita Income and Government Spending in the EU and the CEEs, 1998-2003 
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* Luxembourg and Slovenia are not included. Figure 7. Average Government Investment Ratios in the EU-15 and the CEEs
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* Slovenia is not included. Figures are unweighted averages. Data for 2003 are preliminary. 
 Tables 
Table 1. Net Budgetary Effect of EU Accession 
Authors Net Annual Negative Effect (percent of GDP)
Kopits and Székely (2004) 3 - 4.75
Antczak (2003) 1.7 – 3.1
IMF (2004) 1.0 – 1.5Table 2: Cyclical Budget Sensitivity and Minimal Benchmarks 
in percent in percent in percent
EU-15 0.50 3.83 1.97 -1.03
Austria 0.30 5.17 0.90 -2.10
Belgium 0.60 3.83 2.30 -0.70
Denmark 0.80 5.14 2.70 -0.30
Finland 0.70 3.00 3.80 0.80
France 0.40 3.25 1.30 -1.70
Germany 0.50 3.38 1.40 -1.60
Greece 0.40 5.43 1.30 -1.70
Ireland 0.35 3.75 1.70 -1.30
Italy 0.45 3.25 1.50 -1.50
Luxembourg 0.60 4.86 3.10 0.10
Netherlands 0.65 3.33 2.30 -0.70
Portugal 0.35 3.54 1.80 -1.20
Spain 0.40 2.80 1.50 -1.50
Sweden 0.70 3.14 2.20 -0.80
United Kingdom 0.50 3.60 1.80 -1.20
CEE-8 0.41 4.26 1.68 -1.32
Czech Republic 0.40 4.20 1.70 -1.30
Estonia 0.41 4.78 1.95 -1.05
Hungary 0.44 3.65 1.62 -1.38
Latvia 0.33 4.22 1.39 -1.61
Lithuania 0.33 6.05 2.01 -0.99
Poland 0.49 3.87 1.88 -1.12
Slovakia 0.40 3.87 1.55 -1.45
Slovenia 0.45 3.44 1.54 -1.46
Cyclical Safety 
Margin
Minimal 
Benchmark
Cyclical Budget 
Sensitivity
The Largest Value 
of Output Gap
 
 
 
Sources: EU-15: European Commission (2002); CEE-8: see Annex. Table 3. Dependency Ratios and Fertility Rates
* 
2000 2050 2003
EU-15 25.95 51.40 1.57
Belgium 28.10 49.50 1.62
Denmark 24.20 40.30 1.72
Germany 26.60 53.20 1.31
Greece n.a. n.a. 1.25
Spain 27.10 65.70 1.25
France 27.20 50.80 1.89
Ireland 19.70 45.70 1.97
Italy 28.80 66.80 1.26
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. 1.63
Netherlands 21.90 44.90 1.73
Austria 25.20 58.20 1.40
Portugal 26.70 50.90 1.47
Finland 25.90 50.60 1.72
Sweden 29.40 46.30 1.65
United Kingdom 26.60 45.30 1.64
NMS-10 22.00 53.30 1.29
Cyprus n.a. n.a. 1.49
Czech Republic 21.90 57.50 1.17
Estonia n.a. n.a. 1.37
Hungary 23.70 47.20 1.30
Latvia n.a. n.a. 1.24
Lithuania n.a. n.a. 1.24
Malta n.a. n.a. 1.46
Poland 20.40 55.20 1.24
Slovakia n.a. n.a. 1.19
Slovenia n.a. n.a. 1.21
Old-age Dependency Ratios 
(in percent)
Total Fertility 
Rate
 
 
Sources: OECD (2003) and EUROSTAT 
 
                                              
* Old-age dependency ratio is equal to (persons aged 65+)/(persons aged 20-64). Total fertility rate is defined as the 
average number of children who would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime. In more developed countries, a 
rate of 2.1 is considered to be replacement level. 
 Table 4. Primary Deficit Gaps to Reach 40 percent Debt/GDP Ratios in Ten Years under 
Different Assumptions for Growth and Real Interest Rates (In percent of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EUROSTAT data 
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